Shareholders' voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies

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Title:

Shareholders' voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies

Description:

WP 17/1996; According to our pricing framework block transaction premia depend on voting power being transferred through a block relative to voting power enjoyed by the market. Block transaction premia are shown to be correlated with both the block seller's and the block buyer's Shapley-Shubik power indexes in a sample of Italian companies. This is consistent with the notion, first presented by Zwiebel (1995), that private benefits deriving from control of a company are divisible, and that the share of private benefits accruing to each shareholder is proportional to the probability of being pivotal in a controlling coalition.

Publisher:

CNR Ceris

Date:

1996

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