

- — —, *The dynamics of incentive contracts*, «Econometrica», 56, 1988.
- R. MARRIS, *The economic theory of managerial capitalism*, London, The Macmillan Company, 1964 (trad. it. di Domenico Mario Nuti, *La teoria economica del capitalismo manageriale*, Torino, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1972).
- — A.J.B. WOOD (a cura di), *The corporate economy*, London, The Macmillan Company, 1971.
- J. MARSCHAK, *Optimal incentives in an organization*, in: *Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung: W. Krelle zum 60. Geburtstag*, a cura di H. Albach, E. Helmstadter e R. Henn, Tübingen, Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1977.
- — R. RADNER, *Economic theory of teams*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972.
- J. MARSHALL, *Moral hazard*, «American economic review», 66, 1976.
- T.M. MOE, *The new economics of organization*, «American journal of political science», 28, 1984.
- D.C. MUELLER, *Public choice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- R.B. MYERSON, *Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem*, «Econometrica», 47, 1979.
- W.A. NISKANEN, *Nonmarket decision making. The peculiar economics of bureaucracy*, «American economic review», 58, 1968.
- , *Bureaucracy and representative government*, Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
- , *Bureaucracy: servant or master?*, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, Hobart Paperback, 1973.
- W. ORZECZOWSKI, *Economic model of bureaucracy: survey, extensions and evidence*, in: *Budgets and bureaucrats: the sources of government growth*, a cura di T.E. Borcherding, Durham, Duke University Press, 1977.
- R. RADNER, *Teams*, in: *Decision and organization*, a cura di C.B. McGuire e R. Radner, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1972.
- , *Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship*, «Econometrica», 49, 1981.
- , *The internal economy of large firms*, «Economic journal» (Supplement), 96, 1985.
- A. RAVIV, *Management compensation and the managerial labour market: an overview*, «Journal of accounting and economics», 7, 1985.
- R. REES, *Second best rules for public enterprise pricing*, «Economica», 35, 1968.
- , *Public enterprise economics*, London, Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1976.
- , *A positive theory of the public enterprise*, in: *The performance of public enterprises: concepts and measurement*, a cura di M. Marchand, P. Pestieau e H. Tulkens, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., North-Holland, 1984.
- , *The theory of principal and agent, I e II*, in: *Surveys in the economics of uncertainty*, a cura di J.D. Hey e P.J. Lambert, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987.
- G.C. REID, *Theories of industrial organization*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987.
- M. RICKETTS, *The geometry of principal and agent: yet another use for the Edgeworth box*, «Scottish journal of political economy», 33, 1986.
- , *The new industrial economics: an introduction to modern theories of the firm*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.
- T. ROMER - H. ROSENTHAL, *Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo*, «Public choice», 33, 1978.
- — —, *Bureaucrats versus voters: on the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy*, «Quarterly journal of economics», 93, 1979.