34

THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES

partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But
the German Government has never ventured to state
the French colonial methods as a casus bclli. That the
German people have viewed with jealousy the growth
of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite
recently, on the eve of the present war, we were form·
ally given to understand that Germany, in any war with
France, might annex French colonies; 1 and it is easy
to see how such an object would reconcile the diverge nt
policies of the German military and naval experts.
Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has
consistently refused to believe that Germany would be
mad enough or dishonest enough to enter on a war
of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial e m·
pires. German diplomacy in the past few weeks has
rudely shattered this conviction. But up to the year
1914 the worst which was g enerally anticipated was
that she would pursue in the future on a great scale
the policy, which she has hitherto pursued on a
small scale, of claiming so-called 'compensations' when
other Powers succeeded in developing their colonial
spheres, and of invoking imaginary' interests' as a reason
why the efforts of explorers and diplomatists should not
be allowed to yield to France their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our business to impugn or
to defend the partition of Africa, or the methods by which
it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject
that we should describe the methods by which Germany
has endeavoured to intimidate France at various stages
of the African question. The trouble arose out of a
Moroccan Agreement between England and France,
which was the first definite proof that these two Powers
were drifting into relations closer than that of ordinary
friendship.
1 Correspo11dmce respecting //ze E11mpea11 Crisis (Cd. 7467), No. 85.
Sir E. Gose hen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. Scei11/m, Appendix II.

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