NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS

69

Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion
in Russia '. 1
At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador
that Germany was shie lding Austria in the Servian
business:'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about
in backing up Austria-I-I ungary in this matter. . . . Servian
concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well
knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate
demands of Austria-I-I ungary by the fact that before making
he r offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement ol
Government from Belgrade.''
M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to
have divined this policy of Germany pretty soon : 'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my
impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the
uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin
Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis
deve loping, appear to be exercising no influence upon their
ally. . . . There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to
be found at Berlin.''
When at the beginning of August the crisis had led
to war, it is interesting to observe the opinions expressed
by high and well-informed officials about German
diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion thus:'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and
immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with defiance,
secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the
policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced
policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government
1 Correspondence, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25.
' Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See
also German White Book, p. 5.
' Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonofto Count Benckendorff, July~~. 1914
(communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).