AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS

31

union among her actual or suspected enemies. In r872
he brought about a fri end ly understanding with Austria
and Russia, the oth er two great Powers of Eastern
Europe, the so-called Dreikaiserbii11d11is, which was
designed to perpetuate th e status q110. But the friends hip with Rus ·ia quickly cooled; it received a sharp
set-back in 1875, when th e T sar Alexander II came
forward rathe r ostentatiously to save France from tht;
alleged hostile design of Germany; it was certainly
not im proved when Bis marck in his turn mediated between Russia and he r opponents at the Congress of
Berlin (1878). On the oth er hand, a common interest in
the Eas tern Q uestion drew closer the bonds between
Germany and A ustria. The latter felt herself directly
menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia ; the former
was not prepared to see her so uthern neighbour despoi led o f ter ritory. H ence in 1879 was initiated that
closer union between Germany and Austria which has
been so largely responsible for the present situation. The
Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was
purely de fensive in its character ; but the terms showed
that Russia was the enemy whom both the contracting
Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to active
measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia,
or any Power w hich had Russian support. In 1882 the
alliance of the two great German Powers was joined by
Italy-a surprising development which can only be explained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not
hope for security at home, 01· for colonial expansion in
the Mediterranea n, so long as she remained in isolation.
The Triple Alliance so constituted had a frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy would
receive strong support from partners in comparison with
whose resources her own were insignificant. But the
Triple Alliance has endured to the present day, the
most permanent feature of the diplomatic system of the
last thirty-two years. \;l/hether the results have been