NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 73
propose a form of mediation acceptable to themselves
before graver events had occurred, the first period of
the negotiation comes to a n encl. The responsibility
of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil
day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, fall s
solely on the s houlders of G ermany. The reasons
advanced by H e rr von Jagow we re erroneous, and
though Dr. von Bethmann-1-Iollweg, the Imperial Chan·
cellar, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may
be noted that the G erman White Book 1 continues to
mis re present Sir Edward Grey 's proposal as a con·
fe rence on the particular question of the Austro-Servian
di spute, and not on the general situation of Europe.
In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at
negotiation by direct conversations betwee n the parties
concern ed, with no advantag e, but rathe1· with the growth
of mutual s uspicion. Down to Aug ust 1st both Sir
E dward Grey a nd M. Sazonof were busy try ing to find
some formula which might be accepted as a basis for
postponing hostilities between the Great Powers. And
he1·e it may be well to point out that Prince Lich·
nowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his
chi efs. On .July 24th, the clay afte r the Austrian note
was presented, he was so little acquainted with the
true state of affairs, that speaking privately he told
Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourabl e on some
points must be sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse
against immediate action might be afforded to Austria '.2
And in the matter of the conference, on the very clay
that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against
e ntering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky
informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Governmentaccepted in principle mediation between Austria and
Russia by the four Powe rs, reserving, of course, their
' p. 8 and Exhibit 1 2 (sec infra Appendix I).
' Correspondeuce, No. II. Sir E. Grey to Sir H. Rumbold,
July 24.