70

NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS

knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum;
what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian
Government had been postponed until the moment had
passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany
was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and
St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who
had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Govern·
ment that Russia would never go to war.' '

And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote
that he agreed with his Russian colleague that
•the German Ambassador at Vienna des ired war from the
first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the
German Government also desired war from the first.''

Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opi nion
concerning the attitude of the German Government, but
there can be no doubt that this general attitude was
most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and that
if the German Government had desired war they could
scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end.
No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which
under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any
lengths against Servia. Over and over again the
German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply
interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As
late as July 2Bth the German Chancellor himself refused
'to discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's
standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel
with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which
Russia had nothing to do '.3 Next day the German
Ambassador at Vienna was continuing •to feign surprise
' Correspondence, No. 139· Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
August l.
' Ibid. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August l.
' Ibid. No. 71. Sir E. Goschcn to Sir E. Grey, July 28.